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A considerable attention has been paid on a question of whether trade promotes 
productivity and growth from academic and policy perspectives (Frankel and Romer, 
1999; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Alcalá and Ciccone, 2004; Badinger, 2008; Harrison 
and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010). The prior literature examines the impact of trade 
liberalization on productivity in developing economies and generally shows a positive 
impact of lower trade barriers on productivity (Fernandes, A. M., 2007; Topalova and 
Khandelwal, 2011; Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 2017). However, prior studies 
predominantly focus only on the formal sector, thereby missing a vast number of 
unregistered small enterprises in developing economies (Schneider and Enste, 2013; La 
Porta and Shleifer, 2014). Because systematic panel data on both formal and informal 
firms are not readily available, the impact of trade on the formal and informal sectors 
remains largely unclear.1 
In this paper, I seek to investigate the impact of trade on productivity by using newly 
constructed panel data on formally registered and unregistered establishments in 
Cambodia. For an empirical strategy, a key issue is an endogenous relationship between 
trade and productivity.2 This paper exploits a natural experiment from the EU’s reform 
in rules of origin (ROO) under the EU generalized-system-of-preferences (GSP) scheme: 
a policy shock involving Cambodia’s garment exports to the European Union (EU). The 
European Union (EU) granted Cambodia with duty-free and quota-free access under the 
Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme in 2001, and simplified restrictive origin 
requirements for the EU GSP after January 2011. After the EU’s reform, garment 
exporters could use imported fabric from any third country and still maintain preferential 
treatment. Consequently, garment exports from Cambodia to the EU markets increased 
sharply after 2011, which coincided with a surge in textile imports to Cambodia from 
China. The policy shock was substantial for the Cambodian economy as the garment 
industry accounted for 77.7% of total commodity exports in 2014 (UN COMTRADE). 
Thus, I seek to identify the productivity effects of trade by exploiting a positive export 
shock to the garment industry and a negative import shock to the textile industry. 
To guide an empirical assessment, I discuss theoretical mechanisms through which 
trade shocks due to the EU’s reform in ROO affect productivity for formal and informal 
firms in the garment and textile industries. First, simplifying ROO should reduce the costs 
of garment production through the better mix of inputs and lower documentation costs of 
                                                   
1 As data on employment in the formal and informal sectors tend to be more readily available for 
research, a growing number of studies examine the impact of trade liberalization on formal and 
informal employment (Aleman-Castilla, 2006; Becker, 2018; Heid et al., 2013; Heid, 2016; Paz, 2014). 
2 Another issue is a lack of data on exports and imports at the firm level in the Cambodian dataset. 
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proving origin, which would translate into an efficiency improvement in garment 
production during the post-reform period. Meanwhile, garment exporters must obtain a 
certificate of origin (CO) document to obtain preferential treatment. Since the government 
issues the CO document only for legally established enterprises, preferential market 
access is open only to formal firms. For these reasons, the export shock due to the EU’s 
reform should have a positive direct impact on productivity in formal garment firms. 
Second, formal garment exporters may outsource garment orders beyond their capacity 
to informal garment factories, and provide imported inputs and technical knowledge for 
their informal subcontractors. The export shock may also lead to productivity 
improvements in informal garment firms through horizontal export spillovers. 
Third, the EU’s reform in ROO removed the local input requirements for preferential 
access to the EU markets, which consequently intensified import competition in the 
textile industry with imported textiles from competitive third markets. If formal textile 
firms were supplying to formal garment manufacturers in the pre-reform period, the 
import competition affects their productivity through several channels, including a loss 
of scale economies, pro-competitive effects, and demand shocks to local textile 
production. These conflicting effects suggest an ambiguous prediction for the overall net 
impact of import competition on productivity in formal textile firms. Finally, informal 
textile firms should serve low-income consumers in a local market, so that their textile 
products differentiate sufficiently from imported textiles. This implies an unclear impact 
of import competition on informal textile firms. 
To assess these hypotheses, this paper adopts a standard difference-in-differences 
(DID) method and constructs a new panel dataset at the establishment-level in Cambodia. 
It is generally very hard to construct a nationally representative panel data on both formal 
and informal firms because it is difficult to track informal small establishments (Rand and 
Torm, 2012; Demenet et al., 2016). To fill this gap, I use the Economic Census in 2011 
(EC2011) and the Inter-censal Economic Survey in 2014 (ES2014). These surveys cover 
virtually all the establishments and enterprises over the entire territory of Cambodia, 
without any threshold of establishment size. Based on face-to-face interviews, these 
surveys ask all establishments about their registration with the Ministry of Commerce and 
official license/approval from other ministries and agencies. I exploit these questions to 
define the formal sector as the business activities of the establishments that have formal 
registration or official license/approval. I define the other establishments as the informal 
sector. Thus, my data allow for a systematic assessment of post-reform trade impacts on 
both formal and informal firms during the period 2011 and 2014. 
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The main findings are summarized as follows. Labor productivity increased 
significantly by 75% for the garment industry during the post-reform period, but did not 
change significantly for the textile industry. Separating these overall net impacts between 
formal and informal firms, I find productivity improvements for both formal and informal 
establishments in the garment industry. Formal establishments in the textile industry do 
not exhibit any productivity improvements. Thus, these findings are consistent with the 
predicted impacts of trade shocks due to the EU’s reform in ROO. Additionally, the main 
results are robust to alternative clustering in standard errors and an alternative measure of 
economic performance. Additionally, I construct a transition matrix of establishments 
between formality and informality during 2011 and 2014, and find that the vast majority 
of establishments remained either formal or informal during the period. While previous 
work such as Becker (2018) indicates that trade liberalization may induce formal firms to 
switch to the informal sector for survival, there is little evidence on the transition effects 
on productivity. 
The main contribution in this paper is to present new evidence of positive export 
effects on productivity for both formal and informal firms. As prior work predominantly 
focuses only on large formal firms, productivity effects of trade remain largely unclear 
for developing economies with the large presence of informal businesses. This paper 
demonstrates that better access to export markets can improve productivity in both formal 
and informal sectors, thereby supporting a crucial role of trade in promoting economic 
growth. In terms of import competition effects induced by trade liberalization, related 
studies exploit either panel data on large firms (Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011; Doan et 
al., 2015) or repeated-cross section data on large and small firms (Nataraj, 2011). Because 
it is largely unexplored whether import shocks affect productivity for small informal firms, 
this paper sheds new light on this linkage between trade and productivity. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background for the 
EU’s reform in ROO and discusses implications for garment exports and textile imports 
in Cambodia. Section 3 discusses theoretical mechanisms through which trade shocks due 
to the EU’s reform in ROO affect productivity for formal and informal firms. Section 4 
explains a difference-in-differences method to identify the causal impact of trade shocks 
on productivity. Section 5 describes data sources and a basic feature of my panel data. 
Section 6 presents estimation results and robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
To explain background, I briefly describe the EU’s reform processes in rules of origin 
(ROO) for preferential market access. I present descriptive evidence of large changes in 
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garment exports and textile imports in Cambodia after 2011. 
 
2.1. The EU’s Reform in Rules of Origin 
Garment products have been a leading export commodity in the Cambodian economy 
since 2000s. 3 The EU markets are a key destination market for garment exports in 
Cambodia since Cambodia became a beneficiary country under the EBA initiative in 2001. 
As part of the EU GSP, the EBA scheme grants least developing countries with duty-free 
and quota-free access for all tariff lines except for arms and ammunition. To obtain duty-
free access, exporters in beneficiary countries must meet the origin-conferring conditions 
in the EU GSP. In the previous ROO for garment products, garment producers were 
generally required to use domestically produced fabric and/or imported fabric in 
restrictive conditions to qualify for duty-free access to the EU markets. In principle, 
garment exporters must conduct double transformation, i.e., manufacture from yarn, to 
obtain preferential market access to EU. 
The European Commission (EC) adopted a Green Paper on ‘the future of rules of 
origin in preferential trade arrangements’ in 2003 to assess the issues in the previous ROO. 
The EC launched a consultation process to evaluate interests at stake from EU members, 
private sectors, industry associations, and civil society. This consultation led to the 
conclusion that an effective preferential trade policy needs simplification and relaxation 
of the origin rules and procedures. The EC adopted a communication on ‘the rules of 
origin in preferential trade arrangements: orientations for the future’ in 2005. By setting 
general principles of simplification and development-friendliness, the EC supported a 
draft regulation for the reform of GSP origin rules. On November 18, 2010, the EC 
adopted a new regulation on the ROO for EU GSP, which came into effective on January 
1, 2011.4 
The EU’s reform has two significant implications for analysis. First, the EC simplified 
the origin requirements for garment products from double to single transformation, i.e., 
manufacture from fabric.5 To meet the product-specific origin requirements, garment 
producers were only required to manufacture garments from fabric, implying that they 
                                                   
3 Garment manufacturing industry started to develop since Cambodia obtained the most-favored-
nation (MFN) status from the U.S. in 1996 and the generalized-system-of-preferences (GSP) status 
from the EU in 1997 (Bargawi, 2005; Yamagata, 2006; Asuyama et al., 2013). Garment exports in HS 
Chapters 61 and 62 accounted for 69.3% of total commodity exports in 2000, which increased to 
77.7% in 2014 (UN COMTRADE). 
4 For details, see Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code. 
5 As Inama (2011) explains major changes of origin requirements in the new regulation, the EC also 
liberalized origin-conferring criteria for other agricultural and manufacture goods. 
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can use imported fabric produced anywhere and still obtain preferential treatment. 
Because domestic textile industry is largely underdeveloped in Cambodia, garment 
producers typically specialize in cut, make and trim (CMT) tasks while they use imported 
intermediate inputs such as yarn, fabric, and accessories (Bargawi, 2005; Yamagata, 
2006; Asuyama et al., 2013). Because the double-transformation requirement effectively 
prevented these producers from using preferential access, the EU’s reform could 
substantially promote Cambodia’s garment exports. 
Second, EBA beneficiary countries such as Cambodia had no direct influence in 
determining specific revisions in origin rules applicable to EU GSP. The policy report by 
the Royal Government of Cambodia (2014, p. 44) indicates that “the rules of origin 
applicable to GSP and DFQF (duty-free quota-free) programs are determined unilaterally 
by the countries offering Cambodia those programs. Cambodia has no influence over 
these rules, except through moral suasion.” It is reasonable to consider that the EU’s 
reform in the GSP ROO is an exogenous policy change for garment and textile industries 
in Cambodia. 
 
2.2. Garment Exports and Textile Imports in Cambodia 
From a theoretical point of view, the EU’s reform in ROO should reduce production 
costs of garment exports in Cambodia. In the previous ROO, garment exporters could not 
use the most competitively priced inputs from third markets to qualify for preferential 
access. As the binding ROO constrain the choice of inputs in garment manufacture, the 
unit cost of production must increase with the restrictiveness of the origin requirements 
(Krishna, 2006). Additionally, garment exporters must obtain a certificate of origin (CO) 
document to prove the origin of their garment products. This procedure involves 
documentation of sourcing to keep track of the origin of inputs and their usage, thereby 
increasing the production costs. 
Since simplifying ROO should reduce these extra production costs to use preferential 
access, garment exports from Cambodia would increasingly enter the EU markets under 
duty-free treatment after 2011. To confirm this prediction, Figure 1 presents quarterly 
garment imports in the EU markets from Cambodia for the period 2008-2014.6 Using the 
EUROSTAT database, I show the value of garment imports in HS Chapters 61 and 62 
from Cambodia eligible for duty-free access in the EU markets. Diamond and circle 
markers indicate the imports that actually entered under duty-free and MFN rates, 
respectively. With seasonal fluctuations, duty-free imports started to increase sharply after 
                                                   
6 While this section does not aim to establish a causal relationship between the reform and trade, 
considerable evidence of the causal impacts on garment exports is found in Tanaka (2019). 
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2011. This pattern accords well with the fact that the new ROO in the EU GSP became 
effective in January 2011. Additionally, MFN imports remained similar in value during 
the period, implying that unobserved positive shocks to garment imports in the EU 
markets would not account for a sharp increase in the duty-free imports. Thus, the EU’s 
reform in ROO led to a substantial increase in garment imports from Cambodia to the EU 
markets. 
---Figure 1 here--- 
Was the trade shock quantitatively large in the Cambodian economy? If an increase 
in garment exports from 2011 to 2014 were small as compared with other export products, 
the trade shock would yield only a minor influence on productivity in the garment 
industry. To this end, Figure 2 presents the top 10 export goods for 2011 and 2014 
according to the total value of exports for these periods (UN COMTRADE).7 Garment 
products are the largest export goods, with an increase in the value of garment exports 
from 3.9 billion USD in 2011 to 5.3 billion USD in 2014. The second largest export goods 
is miscellaneous manufacturing products, but its value declined in these periods. As the 
third largest export goods, the value of footwear exports increased from 0.27 billion USD 
in 2011 to 0.42 billion USD in 2014. The value of exports in the other products is 
significantly smaller. Thus, an increase in garment exports was substantially larger than 
other export products. 
---Figure 2 here--- 
Did the EU’s reform in ROO bring about any significant impact on textile imports? 
As described in Natsuda et al. (2010) and Staritz (2011), China is a key import market for 
yarn, fabric, and accessories used for garment production in Cambodia. Since the EU’s 
reform could increase sourcing from highly competitive textile industries in China, I 
predict a large increase in textile imports.8 To check this prediction, Figure 3 presents the 
top 10 import goods according to the total value of imports in 2011 and 2014. The largest 
import goods is textile products. The value of textile imports increased from 2.1 billion 
USD in 2011 to 3.7 billion USD in 2014. The second and third largest goods are 
petroleum and road vehicle products. The import value of these products decreased for 
these periods. The other import goods show the import value of less than 0.5 billion USD. 
Thus, the textile imports significantly increased during the study period. 
---Figure 3 here--- 
 
                                                   
7 The goods category is based on the 2-digit standard international trade classification, revision 4. 
8 Appendix Figure 1 shows a trend in textile imports from China in Cambodia. Consistent with the 
prediction, there was a sharp increase in textile imports from China after 2011. 
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3. Conceptual Framework 
This section presents a conceptual framework to discuss theoretical mechanisms 
through which trade shocks due to the EU’s reform in ROO affect productivity in formal 
and informal firms. I discuss the theoretical prediction in the garment industry, followed 
by the textile industry. 
A sharp increase in garment exports to the EU after 2011 supports that the pre-reform 
ROO in the EU GSP were binding on garment exporters in the choice of imported inputs 
to qualify for preferential treatment. Simplifying ROO should reduce the costs of garment 
production through a better mix of inputs and lower documentation costs of proving origin. 
As a result, a reduction in production costs would translate into an efficiency 
improvement in garment production. This prediction is consistent with the prior literature 
to show that imported inputs from foreign markets increase productivity (Amiti and 
Konings, 2007; Kasahara and Lapham, 2008; Halpern et al., 2015). 
In developing economies, a dualistic distinction between the formal and informal 
sectors is crucial for considering theoretical mechanisms through which imported inputs 
affect productivity. Specifically, garment exporters must obtain a CO document to certify 
the origin of their products shipped. In the case of the EU GSP, the CO is required for the 
goods upon entering the EU markets. Generally, the government issues the CO document 
only for legally established enterprises, so that exporters must first establish a formally 
registered enterprise to apply for the CO documents. In this respect, preferential market 
access to EU is open only to formally registered firms. Therefore, I predict that formally 
registered firms would benefit directly from productivity effects of simplifying ROO 
through imported inputs of higher quality and lower price. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Trade shocks due to the EU’s reform in rules of origin would lead to a 
productivity improvement for formally registered firms in the garment industry. 
 
A formal institution for trade policy may pose an institutional barrier to informal 
firms because they are not able to directly export to the EU under preferential treatment. 
Nevertheless, informal firms may benefit from a positive export shock through an indirect 
channel of export growth. For instance, an inter-firm linkage between formally registered 
exporters and informal firms can play a mediating role in productivity improvements for 
informal firms.9 Garment exporters may outsource garment orders beyond their capacity 
to other domestic garment factories in the informal sector. To meet the specification of 
                                                   
9 Consistent with my discussion, Moreno-Monroy et al. (2014) show the positive linkage between 
formal sector subcontracting and informal sector employment in India. 
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garment orders from foreign buyers, garment exporters may provide imported inputs such 
as textiles and accessories for informal subcontractors. They may also provide technical 
training for workers in the informal subcontractors to improve the quality of garment 
products. The provision of imported inputs and technical knowledge can contribute to 
productivity improvements in informal garment factories. 10 While informal garment 
producers do not directly engage in exporting, the positive export shock may affect 
productivity in the informal sector through a contracting relationship with formal 
exporters. Additionally, alternative channels of indirect export effects include technology 
and information spillovers, re-sale of imported intermediate and capital goods, and a 
pooling of workers with industry-specific skills. These unobserved channels may also 
contribute to improve productivity in informal garment factories. Thus, my second 
hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Trade shocks due to the EU’s reform in rules of origin would lead to a 
productivity improvement for informal firms in a garment industry through an indirect 
export effect. 
 
While imported intermediate inputs for garment production is a key source of 
productivity improvements in the garment industry, this mechanism may produce a 
contrasting effect on productivity in the textile industry. Under the previous ROO, rules 
of cumulation allowed garment exporters in Cambodia to use imported fabrics from such 
markets as EU and ASEAN. Meanwhile, origin requirements in preferential treatment 
provided an incentive for local production of textile inputs. Since the EU’s reform in ROO 
removed the local input requirements for preferential treatment in the EU markets, it 
would also reduce an incentive for a local supply of textile inputs. As a result, simplifying 
ROO would translate into stronger import competition in domestic textile production 
through a massive import of textiles from competitive third markets. 
Given that formally registered firms in the textile industry were supplying to formal 
garment manufacturers in the pre-reform period, stronger import competition due to the 
EU’s reform affects their productivity through several possible channels. First, they may 
face a decline in their output and an increase in average production costs for a loss of 
scale economies. This translates into a decline in productivity. Second, a pro-competitive 
effect may induce them to improve their production efficiency because they seek to 
                                                   
10 This channel is similar to the idea of horizontal export spillovers in the trade literature (Alvarez and 
López, 2008).  
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continue local production of textile inputs.11 Third, rising import competition produces 
a stronger pressure on smaller unproductive textile firms. A reduction in output prices 
drive these firms to shrink or exit, which shifts an output share from least productive firms 
to more productive firms (Pavcnik, 2002). Remaining firms in a textile market may 
improve their productivity for an output expansion. Additionally, an export expansion of 
garment products should increase an aggregate demand for textile inputs. If imported 
textiles may not fully meet an expansion of input demand, this demand shock can 
encourage local textile production, and thus improve productivity for remaining formal 
textile suppliers. Overall, theoretical predictions are not clear-cut as to a direction of 
import-competition effects on productivity. Prior work also provides mixed evidence on 
productivity effects of import competition (Nataraj, 2011; Topalova and Khandelwal, 
2011; Doan et al., 2015). 
Finally, informal firms in the textile industry would produce textile goods of low 
quality and price for low-income consumers in a local market. Because textiles of high 
quality are used to manufacture garment products for foreign markets, informal textile 
producers are not likely to supply to formal garment manufacturers. Given that their 
textile products are differentiated from imported textiles, import competition would not 
have a substantial impact on productivity in informal firms in the textile industry. Taken 
together, my third hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Trade shocks due to the EU’s reform in rules of origin would have 
ambiguous impacts on the productivity of formal and informal firms in a textile industry. 
 
Taken together, theoretical discussions provide a guide for an empirical specification 
to estimate the trade effects on productivity. Specifically, I highlight a key distinction 
between garment and textile industries to account for the impact of the trade shocks on 
productivity. Within these industries, possible linkages between trade and productivity 
may differ between formally registered and informal firms. Thus, another distinction 
between the formal and informal sectors is also a crucial dimension of analysis in 
developing economies. 
 
4. Empirical Framework 
4.1. Empirical Model 
To examine the hypotheses in the previous section, I adopt a standard difference-in-
differences (DID) method. Specifically, I seek to identify the causal impact of trade 
                                                   
11 For a recent work on pro-competitive effects of trade, see Arkolakis et al. (2019). 
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shocks on productivity by exploiting two sources of variation in productivity: (i) a 
difference in productivity between treatment and control industries, and (ii) a difference 
in productivity between pre- and post-periods. To account for other observable 
determinants of productivity, I specify a benchmark model for firm i, industry j, and year 
t: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝝅𝝅 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is a measure of productivity for firm i in industry j and year t, which is 
explained in section 5.3. 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes on unity for a garment 
industry, and zero otherwise. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes on unity for a textile 
industry, and zero otherwise. As my dataset includes the years 2011 and 2014, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 takes 
on unity for 2014, and zero otherwise. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the firm-level characteristics for firm i in 
year t, including registration/license status and area of business place. The latter variable 
is included as a proxy for capital stock under the assumption that larger size of business 
place is associated positively with the greater amount of capital stock. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  is unobserved 
time-constant fixed effects for industry j. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 is year fixed effects. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is an error 
term. 
Coefficients, 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2, are of my interest. These coefficients should capture the 
impact of trade shocks on productivity changes in the garment and textile industries 
during the post-reform period, respectively. Hypotheses 1 and 2 indicate that a positive 
export shock should lead to productivity improvements in the garment industry, 
suggesting that the coefficient 𝛽𝛽1  should be positive in sign. On the other hand, 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that rising import competition would have both positive and 
negative effects on productivity in the textile industry. While the overall net impacts are 
measured by the coefficient, 𝛽𝛽2, the predicted sign is not clear. By estimating equation 
(1), I seek to estimate the impact of these trade shocks on productivity in the garment and 
textile industries during the post-reform period. 
A concern in equation (1) is unobserved firm-level heterogeneity, which may have a 
large influence on productivity growth during the period. While the firm-level 
characteristics in 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 should help to isolate the firm-level determinants of productivity, 
it is difficult to control for all the relevant factors in individual firms, including 
entrepreneurship, management know-how, inter-firm relationships, and so on. If the 
unobserved firm characteristics correlate significantly with the variables, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, there may be an omitted-variables bias in the estimated coefficients, 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2. 
To address this concern, I extend the benchmark model by explicitly accounting for firm-
level fixed effects: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝝅𝝅 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    (2) 
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where 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 is unobserved time-constant fixed effects for firm i. Equation (2) should reduce 
the possible omitted-variables bias due to unobserved firm heterogeneity that is largely 
constant during the period.  
Estimating equations (1) and (2) gives the overall net impact of the trade shock in the 
garment and textile industries during the post-reform period. However, the estimated 
trade effects may mask potential heterogeneity in the formal and informal sectors. Since 
these specifications do not allow me to examine the hypotheses 1 and 2 separately, it is 
not clear whether the overall net impact is due to both formal and informal firms, or 
whether only formal firms benefit from the trade shock. These questions are largely 
unexplored in the literature, making it ever more important to distinguish between formal 
and informal firms. To address this issue, I estimate equations (1) and (2) separately for 
two samples. Specifically, the first sample excludes the garment and textile 
establishments that did not have formal registration and license in 2011 or 2014. Since 
only formal firms in the garment and textile industries remain in the sample, the variables, 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  should pick up the trade effects only on the formal firms. 
Meanwhile, the second sample excludes the garment and textile establishments that had 
formal registration and license in 2011 or 2014. Since only informal firms in the garment 
and textile industries remain in the sample, the variables, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 should 
pick up the trade effects only on the informal firms. 
 
4.2. Identification Assumptions 
I turn to discuss identification assumptions in estimating a causal impact of trade on 
productivity. First, I mitigate a selection problem by estimating an industry-level 
exposure to trade shocks due to the EU’s reform in ROO. A key empirical challenge in 
the literature is to isolate the sorting effect of heterogeneous firms into exporting because 
more productive firms tend to export (Aw and Hwang, 1995; Clerides et al., 1998; 
Bernard and Jensen, 1999). This selection problem also arises in an importing side 
because more productive firms may select into importing (Kasahara and Lapham, 2008; 
Wagner, 2012; Halpern et al., 2015). For a lack of trade information on individual firms, 
this paper does not seek to disentangle the productivity effect of trade from the sorting 
effect. Meanwhile, I exploit the EU’s reform in ROO as a natural experiment. Because 
the EU’s policy change was largely exogenous for individual garment and textile firms in 
Cambodia, the treatment variables, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, should also be exogenous for 
their productivity levels, thereby reducing a potential bias due to the selection effect. 
Second, I mitigate a composition effect in my dataset by using a balanced panel 
sample. A plausible concern is that the trade shock due to the EU’s reform could induce 
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an entry of productive firms and an exit of unproductive firms during the post-reform 
period. In this case, the treatment effects based on the variables 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
might pick up a change in the composition of sample firms in treatment industries. 
Although one may interpret that the composition effect is part of the productivity effects 
of trade, I use the balanced panel sample in estimation to reduce the composition effect. 
Third, the DID method assumes that treatment and control industries would exhibit 
similar productivity trends in the absence of the EU’s reform after 2011. If the parallel 
trends assumption is not satisfied, the productivity trends in the control industries may 
not be a valid counterfactual productivity trend in the treatment industries that would have 
prevailed in the absence of the EU’s reform. A plausible way to check this assumption is 
to observe productivity trends during the pre-reform period. However, this approach is 
not possible for a lack of accurate available information on productivity in Cambodia 
before 2011. Thus, I can only highlight that the estimated productivity effects of trade 
may contain a possible deviation from the parallel trends assumption on productivity 
between treatment and control industries. 
 
5.  Data Description 
5.1. Data Sources 
A main dataset is constructed from the Economic Census in 2011 (EC2011) and the 
Inter-censal Economic Survey in 2014 (ES2014). These surveys were mainly funded by 
Japanese official development assistance and implemented by the National Institute of 
Statistics (NIS) in the Cambodian Ministry of Planning. The main purpose is to survey 
economic activities of all nonfarm establishments and enterprises over the entire territory 
of Cambodia. 12  The survey defines an establishment as a unit of economic entity 
managed by a single ownership in a single physical location with some durable facilities. 
The survey covers all the establishments and enterprises, including the street vendors that 
operate at a fixed location but can move. 13  Census enumerators visited each 
establishment to interview its representative and/or owner. Through face-to-face 
interviews, the enumerators filled out a questionnaire for each establishment. The NIS 
collected all the questionnaires for data input and checked data consistency by comparing 
two data files made separately by two data-input operators. 
                                                   
12 In a preparation stage for the EC2011, the NIS made the establishment listing in Phnom Penh for 
2006, the establishment survey in Phnom Penh for 2007, and the nation-wide establishment listing in 
2009. 
13 The survey does not cover the establishments classified into (1) agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 
(2) public administration and defense, (3) activities of households as employers, (4) activities of 




The ES2014 is a nationally representative survey based on a stratified multistage 
sampling method. In a first step, all establishments with 50 persons or more are selected. 
The sample includes 1,619 establishments and 508 thousand workers, accounting for 
0.32% of the total number of establishments and 30.3% of the total number of workers in 
the EC2011. In a second step, a stratified multistage sampling method is used to select 
small and micro-scale establishment samples. Specifically, enumeration areas (EAs) used 
in the EC2011 are stratified into three strata according to industrial characteristics. 30 
EAs are selected from 6 largest provinces, and 20 EAs are selected from other 18 
provinces. These sample EAs are allocated to the three strata proportionately in terms of 
the number of EAs in each province. 540 EAs are selected and accounted for around 3% 
of all the EAs in Cambodia. Additionally, up to 30 establishments are selected from each 
EA. 
These surveys ask each establishment about whether they register with the Ministry 
of Commerce or the Provincial Department of Commerce.14 The surveys also ask each 
establishment about the official license or approval from ministries/agencies for their 
business operation. Based on these questions, I define the formal sector as the business 
activities of the establishments that have formal registration or formal license/approval. 
The informal sector is those of the establishments that have neither formal registration 
nor formal license/approval. 
 
5.2. Garment and Textile Establishments in Panel Data 
Table 1 presents the number of manufacturing establishments in the EC2011 and 
ES2014, with the 2-digit industry code of the international standard industry classification, 
revision 4. In the EC2011, the total number of establishments is 8,919 in a textile industry 
and 15,958 in a garment industry. In the ES2014, the number of establishments surveyed 
is 115 and 502, respectively. While the number of establishments is largest in food and 
beverage industries, there are also a large number of establishments in the garment and 
textile industries. 
---Table 1 here--- 
Using these datasets, I construct panel data at the establishment-level for 2011 and 
2014. Appendix A provides details of the data construction. In the Panel column, I show 
                                                   
14 The registration process is (i) to provide the registrar with the specific location of their office and 
the name of their agent; (ii) to deposit the legally required initial capital in a bank and obtain deposit 
evidence; (iii) conduct an initial check of the uniqueness of the company name at the Intellectual 
Property Department and the Business Registration Office, and (ⅳ) to publish an abstract of the 
company organization documents and incorporate the company with the Business Registration 
Department in the Ministry of Commerce. 
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the number of linked establishments with non-missing information on the log of real value 
added per worker in both 2011 and 2014. While the ES2014 shows 1,899 sample 
establishments in total, panel data includes 713 establishments. In panel data, there are 
67 establishments in the textile industry and 149 establishments in the garment industry. 
Table 2 shows a transition matrix of establishments between formality and informality 
for 2011 and 2014. In the garment industry, there are 97 formal and 52 informal 
establishments in 2011. Only one formal establishment becomes informal in 2014 
whereas 4 informal establishments become formal in 2014. In the textile industry, there 
are 33 formal and 34 informal establishments in 2011. No formal establishment becomes 
informal in 2014, while one informal establishment becomes formal in 2014. 
---Table 2 here--- 
Table 2 provides two key findings. First, it is crucial to take into account the large 
presence of the informal sector in manufacturing industries for analysis. Second, some 
establishments switched between formality and informality, but the vast majority of them 
remained formal or informal during this period. From a theoretical point of view, Becker 
(2018) shows that greater domestic competition due to trade liberalization forces low 
productive formal firms to switch to the informal sector for survival. I find that the 
formality-informality transition is unlikely to play a large role in trade adjustments for the 
case of Cambodia. 
 
5.3. A Measure of Productivity 
While panel data on formal and informal firms is a unique feature of my analysis, 
there is an inherently difficult issue in available information for estimating productivity. 
Specifically, a vast number of firms in Cambodia do not record the value of their assets 
precisely, making it difficult to measure the amount of capital stock used in 
manufacturing production. Since there is no available information on components of 
intermediate inputs, a proxy for unobservable productivity shocks is not readily available 
to account for a simultaneity problem in estimating a production function at the firm-level 
(Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg et al., 2015). 
For data limitations, I use labor productivity for analysis. Following prior studies on 
productivity in the formal and informal sectors (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; McCaig and 
Pavcnik, 2018), I define labor productivity as the log of value added per worker for firm 
i and year t: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ln 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (3) 
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where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total amount of sales for the one month, including every income 
gained from operating activities such as selling of goods and providing services. 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total amount of operating expense for the one month, including every 
expense being paid for operating activities such as purchase of material for sales, 
instruments for providing services, rent for shops or others, and employees’ salaries and 
wages. Since 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  includes wage payments, I subtract 𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  from 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.15 Additionally, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total number of workers during one week before 
the starting date of the survey. These include self-employed proprietors, unpaid family 
workers, regular employees, and temporary employees. Finally, the value added is 
deflated using industry-level price deflators.16 
 
6. Estimation Results 
6.1. Main Results 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the main sample used. Labor productivity 
has a mean of 3.60, with a standard deviation of 1.30. Only 10% of establishments have 
a formal registration with the Cambodian Ministry of Commerce or official 
license/approval from other ministries and agencies. The area of business place is less 
than five square meters for 16% of establishments, less than 10 square meters for 41% of 
them, and less than 30 square meters for 68% of them. The majority of establishments 
have a small business area. 
---Tables 3 and 4--- 
Table 4 presents the benchmark results. To account for a possible correlation of 
unobserved shocks to establishments within each industry, I report standard errors 
clustered at the 2-digit industry-level. I use the sampling weights in the ES2014 to weight 
each establishment in the panel data. Column (1) shows the result for equation (1). The 
coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is significant and positive, indicating that labor productivity 
increased by 75% for garment establishments during the post-reform period. 17 This 
finding supports the hypotheses 1 and 2. By contrast, the coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is not 
significant, implying that the overall net impact of the trade shock is negligibly small for 
textile establishments. 
                                                   
15  Since business operation is often less than one month, some establishment may report sales, 
expenses, and wages per day. For these establishments, I multiply the per-day amount with the number 
of working days in a month. The survey questionnaire is designed to mitigate recall errors in past 
business performance, which are critical for the establishments that do not keep a balance sheet. 
16 Unfortunately, there is no accurate available information on a producer price index (PPI) at the 
industry-level in Cambodia. As an alternative proxy, I use data on the industry-level PPI in Thailand 
from the Thai Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices. 
17 The marginal effect is based on the calculation of 100×(exp(0.56)-1). 
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Column (2) presents the result for equation (2) with firm-level fixed effects. The 
coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains significant and positive, implying that labor productivity 
increased by 80.4% for garment establishments. The size of the coefficient remains 
similar in columns (1) and (2). Meanwhile, the coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  remains 
insignificant even after accounting for unobserved firm characteristics. Taken together, 
the benchmark results imply that the overall net impact of the trade shock is positive in 
the garment industry during the post-reform period. By contrast, the impact is negligibly 
small in the textile industry, consistent with the unclear prediction on the overall net 
impact of import competition on the textile industry. There findings support the 
hypotheses on the relationship between trade and productivity in the garment and textile 
industries. 
Table 5 presents the results for formal firms in garment and textile industries. 18 
Column (1) shows the result for equation (1). The coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is significant 
and positive, suggesting that labor productivity increased by 76.8% for formal garment 
establishments. This finding supports the hypothesis 1. By contrast, the coefficient of 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is not significant, implying that labor productivity did not increase significantly 
for formal textile establishments. Additionally, column (2) presents the result for equation 
(2). While the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains significant and positive, the coefficient of 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains insignificant. Taken together, these results show that labor productivity 
increased significantly for formal firms only in the garment industry. 
---Table 5--- 
In column (3), the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is significant and positive, suggesting that 
labor productivity increased by 58.4% for informal garment establishments. This finding 
supports the hypothesis 2. The coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is significant and positive, implying 
that labor productivity increased by 107.5% for informal textile establishments. Column 
(4) shows that the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains significant and positive. The coefficient 
of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains significant and positive, implying that labor productivity increased 
by 203.4% for informal textile establishments. Taken together, these results suggest that 
labor productivity increases significantly for informal establishments in both garment and 
textile industries. While the finding is consistent with the hypothesis 2, it raises a question 
of why informal textile factories increased productivity significantly. I discuss this issue 
in section 6.4. 
 
                                                   
18 Appendix Tables 1 and 2 show the summary statistics for formal and informal firms’ samples, 
respectively. Appendix Table 3 shows that the results remain similar for the samples including only 





6.2. Robustness Checks 
This section presents robustness checks of the main results. First, I have previously 
conducted statistical inference based on the standard errors that are clustering within each 
industry at the 2-digit level, thereby reducing a downward bias in standard errors arising 
from an error correlation within clusters. However, the benchmark sample includes 14 
clusters at the industry-level, which may cause a problem of few clusters (Cameron et al., 
2011). 
To address this concern, Table 6 presents the results of Table 5 with standard errors 
that are clustered at the firm-level. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
remains significant and positive, suggesting that labor productivity increased significantly 
for formal garment establishments. The coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains insignificant. 
Additionally, column (3) for informal firms shows that the coefficients of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 are significant and positive. Column (4) shows that the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is 
positive, but not significant. The standard error increases to 0.32 from 0.24. The 
coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains significant and positive, implying a significant increase in 
labor productivity for informal textile establishments. Overall, the main results are 
generally robust to alternative clustering in standard errors, whereas evidence for informal 
garment establishments may be sensitive to the type of clustering. 
---Table 6--- 
Second, I have previously focused on labor productivity as a measure of economic 
performance. An alternative measure is entrepreneurial profitability. To measure 
profitability, I compute net profits per worker: 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ln((𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ ). I 
deflate net profits with the industry-level price deflators. Table 7 presents the results for 
the profitability measure. Columns (1) and (2) for formal firms indicate that the 
coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is significant and positive, suggesting that profitability increased 
significantly for formal garment establishments. By contrast, the coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
is not significant. Consistent with the main results, there is no significant impact on 
profitability for formal textile establishments. Additionally, columns (3) and (4) for 
informal firms show that the coefficients of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 are significant and 
positive. Thus, informal establishments in garment and textile industries increased their 
profitability significantly. Taken together, the main results are robust to the analysis based 
on a measure of profitability. 
---Table 7--- 
6.3. Discussions on Unobserved Factors 
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The analysis up to this point has indicated productivity improvements in formal and 
informal establishments in the garment industry during the post-reform period, but little 
impact on productivity in formal textile establishments. These findings are generally 
consistent with the predicted trade impacts of the EU’s reform in ROO. However, the 
interaction variables 𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  might pick up unobservable factors in 
garment and textile production. The estimated productivity effects may include not only 
the trade impact, but other unobserved factors in Cambodia. Thus, I discuss relevant 
factors that are not explicitly considered in my model. 
First, these factors include an increase in the minimum wage and a growing 
occurrence of labor strikes in Cambodia. The minimum wage increased from 61 USD in 
October 2010 to 100 USD in February 2014. The statutory minimum wage applies only 
to textile, garment, and footwear industries. Labor strikes occurred frequently in garment 
factories during the sample period. These factors should contribute to an increase in 
production costs for formal garment and textile factories, which would translate into a 
decline in productivity improvements. Since my model does not explicitly account for 
these negative impacts, the estimated productivity effects due to the trade shocks may be 
underestimated.19 
Second, unobserved demand shocks in the non-EU markets may explain productivity 
improvements in formal garment factories. According to the UN COMTRADE data, the 
value of garment exports from Cambodia to EU increased from 1.16 billion USD in 2011 
to 2.16 billion USD in 2014, whereas the value of garment exports to the non-EU markets 
increased from 2.81 billion USD to 3.15 billion USD over the same period. Although the 
export expansion in the EU markets is substantially larger, the export growth in the non-
EU markets might also help to improve productivity in the formal garment factories in 
2014. Thus, the estimated productivity effects may capture a smaller trade effect from the 
non-EU markets. 
 
6.4. Informal Textile Producers 
I conclude this section by discussing the results on informal textile producers. While 
I predict that trade shocks due to the EU’s reform should have little influence on these 
producers, the results show a significant productivity increase for them. This suggests that 
other unobserved factors, rather than trade shocks, may explain the results. After 
examining the sample used in analysis, I find that a majority of informal textile producers 
                                                   
19 These factors are difficult to account for in my model. A dummy variable for minimum wages 
specific to these sectors has a high correlation with treatment variables for garment and textile 
industries, thereby leading to a serious multicollinearity issue. Moreover, systematic data on labor 
strikes are not readily available.  
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in the sample are located in Prey Kabbas district of Takeo province. This province is 
famous for silk production in Cambodia, suggesting that the sample establishments are 
likely to be rural weavers who produce silk textiles on a small scale. Thus, the results 
suggest that these silk weavers in rural villages experienced a significant productivity 
improvement during the period. 
Silk weaving trade in Cambodia developed along the Mekong River since a long time 
ago. While this cottage industrial activity collapsed during the Khmer Rouge period in 
late 1970s, it gradually restored after the end of civil conflicts. Nevertheless, silk 
production in a cottage industry was largely underdeveloped in early 2000s. It is reported 
that silk weavers in Takeo province were generally poor uneducated villagers, and lacked 
technical skills in silk production such as designing, spinning, and dying. Silk weavers 
produce with poor materials such as old wooden handlooms and silk yarn of low quality.20 
Subsequently, development programs for silk weaving in Takeo supported silk weavers 
with technical assistance and marketing. For instance, International Trade Centre (2011) 
reports that rural weavers received training on quality management and weaving 
techniques such as plain, basket, Jacquard, and ikat weaving. 21 Thus, a productivity 
improvement in informal textile producers should be in part due to these assistance 
programs for silk weavers. 
 
7. Conclusion 
A linkage between trade and productivity has received a considerable attention in the 
literature, while a vast number of prior empirical studies focus only on the formal sector 
for analysis. This paper sheds new light on this issue by exploiting newly constructed 
panel data on formally registered and unregistered establishments in Cambodia for 2011 
and 2014. To address an identification problem in trade and productivity, I exploit a 
natural experiment from the EU’s reform in rules of origin (ROO) under the EU 
generalized-system-of-preferences (GSP) scheme: a policy shock involving Cambodia’s 
garment exports to EU after 2011. Specifically, I seek to identify the productivity effects 
of trade by exploiting a positive export shock to the garment industry and a negative 
import shock to the textile industry. 
The results show that labor productivity increased significantly by 75% for the 
                                                   
20 The report is “The Export-led Poverty Reduction Programme in Cambodia – A Case Study” by 
Gabriela Byrde and Marie-Claude Frauenrath in the ITC Export-led Poverty Reduction Program. 
Retrieved from http://www.intracen.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=51778. 
21 Another example is found in Tabitha Foundation Cambodia, which supported silk weaving industry 




garment industry during the post-reform period, but did not change significantly for the 
textile industry. Separating these overall net impacts between formal and informal firms, 
I find productivity improvements for both formal and informal establishments in the 
garment industry. Formal establishments in the textile industry do not exhibit any 
productivity improvements. These findings are consistent with the predicted impacts of 
trade shocks due to the EU’s reform in ROO. These results are robust to alternative 
clustering in standard errors and an alternative measure of economic performance such 
as entrepreneurial profitability. Additionally, a transition matrix of establishments 
between formality and informality during 2011 and 2014 shows that the majority of 
establishments remained either formal or informal during the period. This suggests that 
transition effects between formality and informality should not play a large role in 
accounting for a linkage between trade and productivity. 
I conclude by discussing some implications and unexplored questions. First, my 
findings on informal garment firms point to a plausible linkage between trade and 
productivity in the informal sector through various channels such as horizontal export 
spillovers. An empirical work based on the formal sector may overlook these potentially 
important impacts of trade in developing economies. Although it is generally hard to 
construct panel data on both formal and informal firms, it merits attention on possible 
consequences of indirect export effects on the informal sector. Second, I demonstrate that 
a change in preferential trade programs by high-income countries provides a promising 
natural experiment to identify a causal effect of trade on productivity. Since preferential 
trade programs can have a large exogenous impact on export industries in developing 
economies, my approach is a useful method to address identification for future research. 
Finally, an important issue left for future research is to identify specific mechanisms 
through which firms benefit from trade. It remains an important question of how trade 
affects productivity in the formal and informal sectors. Another unexplored question is an 
employment effect of trade for formal and informal firms (Tanaka and Greaney, 2019). 
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Figure 1. Garment Imports in EU from Cambodia 
 
Notes: The value of garment imports in HS Chapters 61 and 62 from Cambodia eligible for duty-
free access in the EU markets is shown; diamond and circle markers indicate the imports that 
entered under duty-free and MFN rates, respectively; EC2011 and ES2014 indicate the survey 





Figure 2. Top 10 Export Goods in Cambodia 
 
Notes: The top 10 largest export goods are shown according to the total value of exports in 2011 
and 2014; the goods category is based on 2-digit Standard International Trade Classification, 
Revision 4.  




Figure 3. Top 10 Import Goods in Cambodia 
 
Notes: The top 10 largest import goods are shown according to the total value of imports in 2011 
and 2014; the goods category is based on 2-digit Standard International Trade Classification, 
Revision 4. 




Table 1. Number of Manufacturing Establishments 
    Data 
Panel 
ISIC Industry EC2011 ES2014 
10 Food products 27,639 653 328 
11 Beverages 4,436 166 25 
12 Tobacco products 33 7 0 
13 Textiles 8,919 115 67 
14 Wearing apparel 15,958 502 149 
15 Leather and related products 278 37 1 
16 Wood and cork products 1,955 80 23 
17 Paper and paper products 35 8 2 
18 Printing/reproduction of recorded media 284 16 2 
19 Coke and refined petroleum products 2 0 0 
20 Chemicals and chemical products 144 2 3 
21 Pharmaceutical products 10 2 0 
22 Rubber and plastics products 46 26 1 
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 2,826 97 52 
24 Basic metals 38 2 1 
25 Fabricated metal products 4,728 97 29 
26 Computer, electronic, optical products 4 0 0 
27 Electrical equipment 8 2 0 
28 Machinery 20 0 0 
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 3 2 0 
30 Other transport equipment 81 5 1 
31 Furniture 1,196 41 24 
32 Other manufacturing 1,835 13 2 
33 Repair of machinery and equipment 938 26 8 
Manufacturing 71,416 1,899 713 
Notes: Panel indicates the number of establishments that are linked between 2011 and 2014 
and have information on the log of real value added per worker in both years; Manufacturing 
shows the aggregate manufacturing sector; ISIC is the International Standard Industry 
Classification, Revision 4. 





Table 2. Formal and Informal Firms in Panel Data 
Panel A: Garment Industry 
 Year 2014 
Year 2011 Formal Informal Total 
Formal 93 1 94 
Informal 4 51 55 
Total 97 52 149 
Panel B: Textile Industry 
 Year 2014 
Year 2011 Formal Informal Total 
Formal 32 0 32 
Informal 1 34 35 
Total 33 34 67 
Note: Formal is defined as the establishments that register with the Ministry of Commerce or 
obtain official license/approval from other ministries and agencies.  





Table 3. Summary Statistics of the Main Sample 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor productivity 1,426 3.60 1.30 -0.69 8.25 
Garment×Year 2014 1,426 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Textile×Year 2014 1,426 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Registration/license 1,426 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Area of business place      
 Less than 5 m2  1,426 0.16 0.37 0 1 
 5 m2 - less than 10 m2  1,426 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 10 m2 - less than 30 m2  1,426 0.27 0.45 0 1 
 30 m2 - less than 50 m2  1,426 0.13 0.34 0 1 
 50 m2 - less than 100 m2  1,426 0.05 0.23 0 1 
 100 m2 - less than 200 m2  1,426 0.05 0.23 0 1 
 200 m2 - less than 500 m2  1,426 0.01 0.12 0 1 
 500 m2 - less than 1000 m2  1,426 0.006 0.08 0 1 
  Over 1000 m2  1,426 0.05 0.23 0 1 





Table 4. Benchmark Results 
Dependent: Labor productivity 
Variable 
(1) (2) 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Garment×Year 2014 0.56* (0.22) 0.59* (0.25) 
Textile×Year 2014 0.23 (0.21) 0.30 (0.25) 
Registration/license -0.12 (0.28) -0.55* (0.22) 
Area of business place     
 5 m2 - less than 10 m2  0.0093 (0.18) -0.047 (0.41) 
 10 m2 - less than 30 m2  0.0070 (0.25) -0.17 (0.34) 
 30 m2 - less than 50 m2  0.61 (0.45) 0.25 (0.41) 
 50 m2 - less than 100 m2  0.78 (0.58) -0.28 (0.44) 
 100 m2 - less than 200 m2  -0.0065 (0.73) -0.25 (0.82) 
 200 m2 - less than 500 m2  0.55 (0.61) 0.27 (0.77) 
 500 m2 - less than 1000 m2  1.53* (0.56) 1.43** (0.38) 
 Over 1000 m2  1.63 (1.22) 0.69 (0.58) 
Industry fixed effects Y  
Firm fixed effects  Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y 
No. of observations 1,426 1,426 
R-squared 0.22 0.73 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry-level; each observation is weighted 
by sampling weights; constant is not reported; **, *, and + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 





Table 5. Results for Formal and Informal Firms 
Dependent: Labor productivity 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Formal Informal 
Garment×Year 2014 0.57* 0.59* 0.46* 0.49+ 
 (0.22) (0.25) (0.21) (0.24) 
Textile×Year 2014 0.22 0.29 0.73** 1.11** 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.19) (0.18) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y  Y  
Firm fixed effects  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 1,244 1,244 1,164 1,164 
R-squared 0.22 0.74 0.25 0.73 
Notes: Formal excludes the garment and textile establishments that did not have formal 
registration and license in 2011 or 2014; Informal excludes the garment and textile 
establishments that reported formal registration and license in 2011 or 2014; parentheses 
show standard errors that are clustered at the 2-digit industry-level; each observation is 
weighted by sampling weights; constant is not reported; control variables include 
registration/license and dummy variables for the area of business place; **, *, and + indicate 





Table 6. Robustness to Alternative Clustering 
Dependent: Labor productivity 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Formal Informal 
Garment×Year 2014 0.57** 0.59* 0.46* 0.49 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.22) (0.32) 
Textile×Year 2014 0.22 0.30 0.73** 1.11** 
 (0.19) (0.28) (0.25) (0.40) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y  Y  
Firm fixed effects  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 1,244 1,244 1,164 1,164 
R-squared 0.22 0.73 0.25 0.73 
Notes: Formal excludes the garment and textile establishments that did not have formal 
registration and license in 2011 or 2014; Informal excludes the garment and textile 
establishments that reported formal registration and license in 2011 or 2014; parentheses 
show standard errors that are clustered at the firm-level; each observation is weighted by 
sampling weights; constant is not reported; control variables include registration/license and 
dummy variables for the area of business place; **, *, and + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 





Table 7. Robustness to Alternative Performance Measure 
Dependent: Log profit per worker 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Formal Informal 
Garment×Year 2014 0.47* 0.49+ 0.43+ 0.44+ 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.25) 
Textile×Year 2014 0.21 0.27 0.68** 1.07** 
 (0.20) (0.25) (0.19) (0.18) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y  Y  
Firm fixed effects  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 1,230 1,230 1,158 1,158 
R-squared 0.20 0.71 0.23 0.70 
Notes: Formal excludes the garment and textile establishments that did not have formal 
registration and license in 2011 or 2014; Informal excludes the garment and textile 
establishments that reported formal registration and license in 2011 or 2014; parentheses 
show standard errors that are clustered at the 2-digit industry-level; each observation is 
weighted by sampling weights; constant is not reported; control variables include 
registration/license and dummy variables for the area of business place; **, *, and + indicate 





To explain the construction of panel data in Cambodia, I start to describe survey 
methods. In the EC 2011, census enumerators visited each establishment in his/her 
enumeration area to interview its representative and/or owner. The enumerators identify 
individual establishments based on geographic and establishment information. 
Specifically, the geographic information includes province, district, commune, village, 
and enumeration area. The establishment information includes a serial number of 
establishment in village or enumeration area, name and address of establishment, and 
information for contact. Thus, I can use the geographic information and the serial number 
of establishments to generate a unique identification number for every establishment in 
the EC 2011. 
In the ES 2014, there are two survey methods. To survey establishments with 50 
persons or more, regional officers in the National Institute of Statistics visited each 
establishment listed in the pre-printed large-size establishment sample from the EC 2011 
and interviewed its representative and/or owner. To survey small-scale establishments, 
survey enumerators made a list of all establishments within his/her EAs and visited more 
than 30 establishments in the list to interview its representative and/or owner. Since the 
ES 2014 has the geographic information and the serial number of establishments, I can 
also generate a unique identification number for every establishment in the EC 2014. In 
principle, survey enumerators must assign the same serial number for the same 
establishments listed in the EC 2011 and assign the new serial number for new 
establishments in the EAs after 2011. 
Based on these survey methods, I can use the same serial number to link individual 
establishments in the same EAs between 2011 and 2014. However, the serial number may 
be subject to measurement errors such as reporting mistakes. To clean data on matched 
establishments, I exclude the matched sample with a large difference between 2011 and 
2014 in terms of the following variables; a change in a 1-digit industry code; more than 
10 years difference in years of starting business, and possible outliers in employment 
growth rates as defined by the bottom and top 1% of distribution. Removing these 
establishments reduces the risk of linking incorrect establishments across years. 
Additionally, the ES 2014 does not track establishments in terms of contact information, 
implying that the survey in 2014 would preclude the establishments that relocated across 
EAs or shut down after 2011. As contact information in the ES 2014 is not available for 
public access, it is not possible to track relocating establishments. 
Another issue is that linking establishments with the serial number leaves a large 
number of unmatched establishments in the ES 2014, even after accounting for the new 
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entrants that did not exist in the EC 2011. In particular, a large number of micro 
establishments are unmatched, which may lead to a sample selection bias in analysis. A 
plausible reason is that survey enumerators visited establishments listed in the EC 2011, 
but did not assign the same serial number in practice. They might have interviewed the 
same establishments in 2011 and 2014, but would assign incorrect serial numbers, making 
these establishments unmatched in panel data construction. To address this issue, I exploit 
a record linkage method to match observations between two datasets where no perfect 
key fields exist (Herzog et al., 2007). Using the Stata program, reclink, I calculate a 
matching score for observations based on establishment characteristics such as survey 
areas, legal status, representative gender, and business information. I use the matching 
score to link previously unmatched establishments in the EC 2011 and ES 2014. Finally, 
I remove the sample that may incorrectly match in terms of extremely large sales growth 
and deviation across years. 
 
Reference 
Herzog, T. N., Scheuren, F. J., Winkler, W. E. 2007. Data Quality and Record Linkage 




Appendix Figure 1. Fabric Import Trends in Cambodia 
 
Note: Fabric indicates the commodities in HS 5208-12, 5309-11, 5407-08, 5512-16, 56, 57, 58, 
59, and 60; Hong, Kong, Korea, and Taiwan shows the total fabric imports from these markets. 





Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics of Formal Firms 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor productivity 1,244 3.55 1.34 -0.69 8.25 
Garment×Year 2014 1,244 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Textile×Year 2014 1,244 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Registration/license 1,244 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Area of business place      
 Less than 5 m2  1,244 0.14 0.35 0 1 
 5 m2 - less than 10 m2  1,244 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 10 m2 - less than 30 m2  1,244 0.28 0.45 0 1 
 30 m2 - less than 50 m2  1,244 0.14 0.34 0 1 
 50 m2 - less than 100 m2  1,244 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 100 m2 - less than 200 m2  1,244 0.06 0.23 0 1 
 200 m2 - less than 500 m2  1,244 0.02 0.13 0 1 
 500 m2 - less than 1000 m2  1,244 0.005 0.07 0 1 
  Over 1000 m2  1,244 0.06 0.24 0 1 





Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics of Informal Firms 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor productivity 1,164 3.51 1.35 -0.69 8.25 
Garment×Year 2014 1,164 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Textile×Year 2014 1,164 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Registration/license 1,164 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Area of business place      
 Less than 5 m2  1,164 0.14 0.35 0 1 
 5 m2 - less than 10 m2  1,164 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 10 m2 - less than 30 m2  1,164 0.29 0.45 0 1 
 30 m2 - less than 50 m2  1,164 0.14 0.35 0 1 
 50 m2 - less than 100 m2  1,164 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 100 m2 - less than 200 m2  1,164 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 200 m2 - less than 500 m2  1,164 0.01 0.11 0 1 
 500 m2 - less than 1000 m2  1,164 0.003 0.06 0 1 
  Over 1000 m2  1,164 0.05 0.21 0 1 





Appendix Table 3. Robustness for Alternative Samples 
Dependent: Labor productivity 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Formal Informal 
Garment×Year 2014 0.57* 0.59* 0.45** 0.53* 
 (0.22) (0.25) (0.12) (0.19) 
Textile×Year 2014 0.22 0.30 0.57** 0.66* 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.14) (0.29) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y  Y  
Firm fixed effects  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 796 796 560 560 
R-squared 0.23 0.73 0.26 0.68 
Sample 
Only firms with 
registration/license  
in 2011 and 2014 
Only firms without 
registration/license  
in 2011 and 2014 
Notes: Parentheses show standard errors that are clustered at the 2-digit industry-level; each 
observation is weighted by sampling weights; constant is not reported; control variables 
include only dummy variables for the area of business place; **, *, and + indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
